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Third, legislative action might be taken.3 4 Because of the success which
the primer has met in other jurisdictions it is recommended that one
of the methods be used for its adoption.
DICK
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Recent Federal Court Decisions on the Admissibility of Confessions
The Inherent Coercion (Ashcraft Case) Rule
In Haley v. State of Ohio,' a fifteen year old negro confessed to a
murder after having been questioned for five hours by Ohio police officers "in relays of one or two each." The trial court admitted the confession in evidence, along with some other rather substantial proof of
defendant's guilt. His conviction was affirmed by the Ohio appellate
courts. The United States Supreme Court, however, in a 54 decision
reversed the conviction because the majority of the Court found that the
"undisputed evidence suggests that force or coercion" was employed by
the police interrogators, thus constituting a violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The undisputed evidence rilied
upon by the Court was the fact that the fifteen year old defendant had
been questioned about five hours by five or six police officers "in relays
of one or two each." These circumstances the majority of the Court
considered as stggestive of force or coercion. The use of the test of
"suggestion" of force and coercion imparts the same notion as did the
Court's previous expression of "inherent coercion" which was employed
in the Ashcraft case. 2 In other words, what the Court did in both the
instant case and in the Ashcraft case was to make a psychological appraisal of the interrogation and then decide whether it had a tendency
to coerce a confession. The effect of the interrogation on the particular
defendant was of no prime importance, nor did the Court concern itself
with the trustworthiness of the confession. It was sufficient if the .circumstances merely "suggested" coercion.
The Haley case is another illustration of an apparent effort on the
part of the United States Supreme Court to compel state law enforcement officers to employ what it considers higher standards of interrogation practices. This the Court could not do directly because of the absence of supervisory power comparable to that which it has over lower
federal courts and federal officers, but the same attempt is practically
available by extending the Court's interpretation of due process to prohibit "inherently coercive" or "suggestively coercive" police practices.'
3 The legislatuie would seem to have the power to institute such a procedure unless this is considered a change of an essential element of a jury trial. People v..
Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 179 N. E. 898 (1931) ; People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N. E.
400 (1931). Accord Baltimore and Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U. S. 654 (1934);
Walker v. New Mexico and Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 165 U. S. 593 (1S96),
* For some of the research on this problem, the writer is indebted to one Qf his
former classmates, S. Jay Baim.
168 S. Ct. 302 (1948).
2
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
3
For an analysis of the recent series of United States Supreme Court cases on
confessions, in which the above stated conclusion is reached, see Inbau, F.E., Lie
Detection and Criminal Interrogation (2d ed., 1948) 150-162.
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Inconsistent Defenses Regarding Evidence of a Confession
Does an accused person lose his right to contend that a confession was
coerced because of his testimony that the confession was in fact never
made?
In Lee v.State of Mississippi,4 a seventeen year old negro was accused
of assault with intent to rape. At his trial the prosecution offered in
evidence the testimony of two police officers regarding an alleged oral
confession obtained by them from the accused. Objection was made by
the defendant to the admissibility of the confession on the ground that
it had been secured by force. In a hearing out of the presence of the
jury, defendant testified that he had been threatened prior to making
the confession, and his testimony to that effect was uncontradicted. At
this preliminary hearing, and later on during the trial, he also testified
that he did not at any time admit that he committed the crime. His
trial resulted in a verdict of guilty. In affirming the conviction the
Mississippi Supreme Court said that if the accused had not denied having made the confession at all the case probably would have been reversed (because of his uncontradicted testimony during the hearing by
the court on the admissibility of the confession), but that the conviction
must be affirmed because "one accused of crime cannot be heard to say
that he did not make a confession at all, and at the same time contend
that an alleged confession was made under the inducement of fear."
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court the Mississippi
court's decision was reversed on the ground that the defendant's denial
of making the confession did not preclude him from asserting his constitutional right to due process of law. The Court was of the opinion that
the defendant's denial of the confession "went only to the original issue
of whether he actually made the confession," and the defendant still
had the right to show that if a confession was actually made (as the
police testified) he did so because of the coercive methods of his interrogators.
The Delayed Arraignment (McNabb case) Rule
The "civilized standards" rule for federal law enforcement interrogators, as originally stated in the McNabb case,5 seemingly required the
rejection of confessions in any federal cases in which the officers neglected to comply with the statutory duty to take the arrested person
before a committing magistrate "forthwith"
(or "immediately," or
"without unnecessary delay"). Subsequently the rule was modified
somewhat by the Supreme Court in the Mitchell case 6 which held that
the McNabb case exclusionary principle would be invoked only when
the confession was "induced by the illegal detention," and not in a situation such as in the Mitchell case where the confession preceded the illegal detention. Even after the Mitchell case some uncertainty still existed as to the effect of illegal detention of this sort on the admissibility
of confessions. The still prevailing confusion upon this point is illustrated in the recent case of Boone v. United States,7 a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the same
'68 S.Ct. 300 (1948).
5'McNabb v United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
'United Stites v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65 (1944).
164 F. (2d) 102 (1947).

